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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KAREN PENROSE,

;
])

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

]

JEFFREY PENROSE,

;)

Defendant/Appellee.

Case No. 950774-CA

Priority No. 15

]

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JEFFREY PENROSE

JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-2a-3(i) (Supp. 1995).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
I.

Issue: Whether the trial court made adequate and appropriate findings of fact

supporting the amount of alimony it awarded to Ms. Penrose.
Standard of Review: Clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Chambers v.
Chambers, 840P.2d841 (UtahApp. 1992).
II.

Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in its distribution of the

property and debts of the parties.
Standard of Review: Clear abuse of discretion. Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540
(UtahApp. 1993).

III.

Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining the amount

of child support awarded to Ms. Penrose.
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053
(UtahApp. 1995).
IV.

Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by not awarding attorneys'

fees to Ms. Penrose.
Standard of Review: Clear abuse of discretion. Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036
(UtahApp. 1994).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following statutes bear upon the issues in this case:
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1995): See Addendum A attached hereto.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-45-7 (Supp. 1995):

(1) (a) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by
prior court order unless there has been a material change of circumstance
on the part of the obligor or obligee.
(b) If the prior court order contains a stipulated provision for the
automatic adjustment for prospective support, the prospective support
shall be the amount as stated in the order, without a showing of a
material change of circumstances, if the stipulated provision:
(i) is clear and unambiguous;
(ii) is self-executing;
(iii) provides for the support which equals or exceeds the
base child support award required by the guidelines; and
(iv) does not allow a decrease in support as a result of the
obligor's voluntary reduction of income.
(2) If no prior court order exists, or a material change in circumstances
has occurred, the court determining the amount of prospective support shall
require each party to file a proposed award of child support using the
guidelines before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing
award may be granted.
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the
court shall establish support after considering all relevant factors, including
but not limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
2

(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
(f) the ages of the parties; and
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the
support of others.
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and
assess all arrearages based upon the Uniform Child Support Guidelines
described in this chapter.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.12 (Supp. 1995):
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the highest level
specified in the table, an appropriate and just child support amount shall be
ordered on a case-by-case basis, but the amount ordered may not be less than
the highest level specified in the table for the number of children due support.
STATEMENT QF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of
Proceedings, and Disposition in the Court Below
This action for divorce was filed on June 8, 1993. The trial took place before Judge
Sandra N. Peuler on June 14 and 15, 1995. Findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a decree
of divorce were entered on October 18, 1995. The decree of divorce provides that:
1)

The parties were awarded joint legal custody of their son, with Ms.

Penrose to have primary physical custody and Mr. Penrose to have reasonable rights
of visitation. The parties stipulated to this arrangement.
2)

Mr. Penrose was ordered to pay to Ms. Penrose child support of $669

per month.
3)

Mr. Penrose was ordered to pay to Ms. Penrose alimony in the amount

of $1,331 per month for an indefinite period of time, but no longer than the length of
the marriage.
4)

The trial court divided the parties' assets and liabilities equally, based

on its determination of the value of the assets and the nature of the liabilities. The
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business, Designers Carpet Showroom, was awarded to Mr. Penrose since it provides
his income. Mr. Penrose also received a Bronco, two snowmobiles, and a trailer. Ms.
Penrose received a BMW. Mr. Penrose was awarded a certificate of deposit and
ordered to pay the debt associated with the certificate of deposit. The parties' interest
in Utah Water Sports was divided between them equally. Cash in an escrow account
was used to equalize the division of the property, with Mr. Penrose receiving $69,000
and Ms. Penrose receiving $109,000.
5)

The parties were each ordered to pay their own attorneys' fees and

costs.
Ms. Penrose filed a notice of appeal on November 13, 1995.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Plaintiff/appellant Karen Penrose ("Ms. Penrose") and defendant/appellee

Jeffrey Penrose ("Mr. Penrose") were married August 24, 1992, in Salt Lake County, Utah.
[Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated October 18, 1995 (hereinafter "Findings")
no. 2, R. at 605; Transcript of Trial (hereinafter "Tr.") p. 21, R. at 764.]
2.

The parties have one child, Miles. At the time of trial, Miles was almost six

years old. (Tr. p. 21, R. at 764.)
3.

At the time of trial, Ms. Penrose was thirty-four years old, with approximately

one year of college education. (Tr. p. 24, R. at 767.) She had been employed full-time as a
secretary prior to her marriage. She had also worked in the parties' business in Hawaiihiring and training employees, doing payroll, handling advertising, promotions, insurance,
purchasing equipment, and in sales. She also worked in the Designers Carpet Showroom
business. Ms. Penrose continued to work at Designers Carpet Showroom until May of 1993.
(Tr. p. 27, R. at 770.) Ms. Penrose also volunteered for the Olympic Bid Committee. Id.
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4.

Based on Ms. Penrose's background and training, she could expect to make

between $7.00 and $8.00 per hour, or $1,200 per month if she were employed full-time.
(Findings no. 5, R. at 610.) If Ms. Penrose were fully employed, she could contribute
approximately $900 per month net to payment of her own expenses. Id.
5.

Ms. Penrose has good health. Although she had planned a surgical procedure,

the same procedure had been recommended to her six years ago following the birth of her
child, and she had elected not to have surgery at that time. There was no evidence of any
condition relating to her health that would interfere with her ability to obtain employment.
The parties' child will begin kindergarten this fall and will be out of the home for one-half
day during the school year. (Findings no. 5, R. at 609.)
6.

Prior to her marriage, Ms. Penrose received stock from her family. She has

received regular monthly income from that stock. Although the exact amount of her income
has fluctuated, she received at the time of trial about $900 per month. (Findings no. 5, R. at
610.)
7.

Shortly after their marriage, Mr. and Ms. Penrose moved to Hawaii where

they lived in a condominium owned by Ms. Penrose's parents. (Tr. p. 40, R. at 783.) They
had the free use of that condominium. (Tr. p. 41, R. at 784.) Ms. Penrose's father also
provided the parties with an automobile. (Findings no. 5, R. at 610; Tr. p. 41, R. at 784.)
8.

In 1988, the parties sold their business in Hawaii and moved back to Utah.

(Tr. pp. 44-45, R. at 787-88.)
9.

The parties' lifestyle during their marriage was lavish.

They traveled

extensively, gave each other expensive gifts (such as jewelry, clothing, and furs), and owned
luxury cars and expensive homes.

Much of this lavish lifestyle was financed by Ms.

Penrose's parents who provided the parties money, paid for their travel, and provided most of
their financial living requirements for almost four years of their marriage. Because of the
fact that Ms. Penrose's family provided a home and a vehicle during the time the parties lived
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in Hawaii, they were able to concentrate their energy and resources on developing a business
in Hawaii. Ultimately, they sold that business at a profit and were able to save a large sum of
money from the earnings of the business. (Findings no. 5, R. at 610.)
10.

When the parties returned to Utah in 1988, the proceeds of the sale of their

business and money saved from its profits were used to purchase a home and luxury cars.
Thereafter, Ms. Penrose's parents continued to provide financial benefits to the parties that
allowed them to maintain a lifestyle beyond what they could have afforded through their own
income. In fact, the parties had spent all of the income from their business and had not set
anything aside as savings. (Findings no. 5, R. at 611.)
11.

Mr. Penrose's income in the years 1991 through 1994 averaged approximately

$126,000 from Designers Carpet Showroom. However, during those same years, Designers
Carpet Showroom had failed to pay required sales tax from its business profits to the extent
of approximately $46,000 per year. If that amount had been paid as required by law, the
income of the parties from Designers Carpet Showroom would have averaged closer to
$80,000 per year. Id.
12.

In 1994, Mr. Penrose's income from Designers Carpet Showroom was

$107,188, or an average of $8,932 per month. In that year, the business paid the required
sales tax. Therefore, the court found the appropriate income to attribute to Mr. Penrose was
$8,932 per month. (Findings no. 5, R. at 611-12.)
13.

The court calculated child support based on Mr. Penrose's income of $8,932

and Ms. Penrose's imputed income of $2,100 per month ($1,200 from employment, $900
from family stock). (Findings no. 6, R. at 612.)
14.

The court found Ms. Penrose's reasonable living expenses to be $3,800 per

month. The court specifically found that each of the parties had claimed excessive expenses
based on the lifestyle they enjoyed during their marriage, which was financed not only by
their own incomes, but also by savings accrued from their Hawaiian business and by Ms.
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sepai ation

and during the time that Mr. Penrose was paying child support and alimony, and Mr. Penrose
did not receive any benefit from them. (Tr. p. 298, R. at 1042.)
18.

Mr. Penrose had acquired a certificate of deposit to pledge in connection with

his business, Utah Water Sports. The amount of that certificate of deposit originally was
$65,000. However, Mr. Penrose had borrowed $40,000 in connection with the certificate of
deposit from his grandmother. The court awarded the balance of the certificate of deposit,
approximately $29,000, to Mr. Penrose and ordered him to repay $40,000 to his
grandmother. (Findings no. 13(c), R. at 615.)
19.

The court divided the parties' interest in Utah Water Sports between them

equally. (Findings no. 13(b), R. at 615.)
20.

The court awarded a Bronco, two snowmobiles, and a trailer to Mr. Penrose,

and a BMW to Ms. Penrose. (Findings no. 13(e), R. at 616.)
21.
residence.

The parties had funds in escrow resulting from the sale of their marital
That sale occurred after their separation.

The balance in the account was

approximately $178,000. Ms. Penrose received $109,000 from that account, and Mr. Penrose
received $69,000. The court made this unequal division of proceeds to equalize the property
distribution. (Findings no. 13(g), R. at 616-17.)

INACCURATE STATEMENTS FROM
APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts set forth in Ms. Penrose's brief contain some inaccurate
statements. Those statements are as follows:
1.

Appellant's statement of fact no. 8 asserts that Ms. Penrose needs significant

surgery in the foreseeable future. This statement ignores the trial court's finding that the
same surgery was recommended to her six years ago and that she elected not to have surgery
at that time. (Findings no. 5, R. at 609.) The statement further ignores the trial court's
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court in this case made careful, detailed findings of fact on the significant
issues. Ms. Penrose has completely ignored those findings of fact in making the arguments
set forth in her brief. She has further ignored her obligation to marshal the evidence in
support of the findings of fact and then demonstrate that, despite this evidence, the trial
court's findings are lacking in support.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the amount of alimony awarded to Ms.
Penrose. The trial court made findings as to her reasonable needs, her ability to earn income,
and the amount of income she receives from certain stock gifted to her by her family, and
awarded sufficient alimony to her to meet her reasonable needs.
The trial court also made careful and detailed findings of fact in support of its 50/50
property division. The debt that Mr. Penrose was required to repay to his grandmother was
documented and had been used to acquire an asset—the certificate of deposit which was
awarded to him. The alleged debt to Ms. Penrose's father was incurred after the parties'
separation for her personal needs, attorneys' fees, detective fees, and for her treatment at the
Betty Ford Center. The uncontroverted evidence supports the valuation of Designers Carpet
Showroom at zero, and that valuation was based on the testimony of the business evaluator
agreed to by both parties.
The trial court's child support award is also appropriate.

The trial court is not

required by Utah law to increase the amount of child support beyond the guideline amount
when the parties' combined income exceeds the guidelines only slightly.
The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award attorneys' fees to
Ms. Penrose.
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I;IIMENI

I.

T H E TRIAL COURI MADE ADEQUATE AND APPROPRIATE
FINDINGS OF FACT SUPPORTING THE AMOUNT OF
ALIMONY IT AWARDED TO MS. PENROSE.

A.

The Trial Court Was Not Required To Award Sufficient Alimony To
Enable Ms. Penrose To Maintain the Same Standard of Living She
Enjoyed During the Parties' Marriage. Since that Standard of Living
Was Based on Support from Ms. Penrose's Family.
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Penrose's parents purchased a home for her to live in, for which she purchased carpet,
shutters, blinds, wallpaper, banisters, and new furniture. Ms. Penrose also leased a Mercedes
through her father at a cost of $338 per month.
Obviously, Mr. Penrose cannot be expected to pay alimony sufficient to replace all
the gifts and financial assistance provided by Ms. Penrose's parents. In her brief, Ms.
Penrose totally ignores the fact that the trial court made the foregoing findings and argues
that the parties' lifestyle was in fact financed by their own income. See, e.g., page 12 of Ms.
Penrose's brief. In attempting to ignore the trial court's findings of fact, Ms. Penrose does
not do what this court has repeatedly required that appellants in her circumstances do; that is,
"marshall the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight
of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478,
481 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted). Not only has Ms. Penrose not marshaled the
evidence, she has not even offered any citations to the record to support her contention that
the parties' income was somehow sufficient to finance their lifestyle.
Ms. Penrose also argues that additional alimony should have been awarded because
Mr. Penrose's personal expenses were minimal in amount. Mr. Penrose testified that he was
required to reduce his personal expenses for the two-year period between the parties'
separation and the trial in this matter in order to pay his temporary alimony and child support
obligations. (Tr. p. 297, R. at 1041.) It is indeed ironic that Ms. Penrose would argue that
Mr. Penrose's standard of living ought to be reduced substantially below that which the
couple enjoyed during their marriage so that hers could be raised to the level financed by her
family's resources.
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B.

The Trial Court Properly Considered the Jones Factors and n> • .wrings
of Fact Should Not Be Overturned on Appeal.
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In this case, the trial court considered the Jones factors.

First, in determining the

finaiu'ial umdilion and nerds of tin1 inn it\nig spouse the IIMI niiull said
[P]laintifFs reasonable living expenses are approximately $3,800 per month.
Both parties claimed excessive expenses which their incomes will not support.
In part, this is based on the lifestyle they enjoyed during their marriage, which
was financed not only by the parties' own income from the businesses, but
savings accrued from their Hawaiian business, and by plaintiffs parents who
assisted the parties' abiiit\ to enjo\ an extravagant lifestyle. As to plaintiffs
•• stated monthl) expenses. ••!:•. presently pays no real property taxes or
^ insurance on the residence • - hich she resides. She is renting that home
from her father and she testified that she pays rent when she is able to do so.
Defendant further testified and the court finds credible that plaintiffs father
pays for the maintenance on the home. Plaintiff currently pays no medical or
dental insurance premiums, and the •*••;' fun her nd • VVM her telephone
expense and other expenses, such as entertammem grooming, installment
payrr1'*"!^ ->^: ;.^-*™~ to Y es, are excessive,
(Findings no -. K ^ M-1 •; _VI
M^ Penrose's claimed expenses were indeed e\ces<iv

-vchm'j the *iLMj\-

^

not pa>, Mi! oropern m,^,ranee that she doe*- not p<^* mamienancc that she does not pax,
$198 per month as a telephone expense, laundry and dry-cleaning expense of $115 per month
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when she is not employed, $200 per month as child care expense when she is not employed,
$500 per month as entertainment expense, grooming expenses of $248 per month, $120 per
month for gasoline, installment payments to her dentist, VISA, Chase Manhattan,
Mastercard, Nordstrom, and Dillards of $450 per month, and estimated income taxes of $450
per month. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 12, Addendum C attached hereto.) The trial court had ample
justification for finding that these expenses were inflated.
Further, Ms. Penrose's argument ignores the fact that Mr. Penrose does not have
sufficient net income to pay the alimony she desires.

As Bret Winn, Mr. Penrose's

accountant, testified, under a best case scenario, Mr. Penrose could expect to have $69,481
net income available to him from Designers Carpet Showroom if he did not have to repay the
sales tax liability. (Tr. pp. 345-46, R. at 1089-90; Defendant's Exhibit 7, Addendum D
attached hereto.) If Mr. Penrose does have to pay the sales tax liability out of the business
profits, he could expect to have between $23,000 and $41,000 in net income available to him.
(Tr. pp. 345-46, R. at 1089-90; Defendant's Exhibit 9, Addendum E attached hereto.)
Obviously, he cannot afford to pay the amount of alimony suggested by Ms. Penrose with
that income.
Even using the best case scenario, Mr. Penrose has approximately $70,000 in annual
net income, for a monthly net income of $5,833. If he pays a total of $2,000 in alimony and
child support to Ms. Penrose, he has $3,833 to live on. Ms. Penrose likewise has $3,800 per
month to live on. The liability to the Utah State Tax Commission further reduces the net
income available to Mr. Penrose.
"In formulating alimony awards, the trial court has broad discretion, and its decisions
will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice."

Morgan v.

Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 567 (Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted). In Morgan, the findings of
fact made by the trial court were less specific mathematically than the findings in this case.
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I lowever, because the trial court had considered the proper factors, this court affirmed the
ti la! coiii ( s aw ai d of alii norry

. • •..,•"•' . • ••' ,

•

:

.;•

• ••••• ;.'

•

Since the trial court: in this case made complete and appropriate findings of fact with
respect to alimony, this court should not disturb its award.

BU

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
ITS DISTRIBl JTION OF THE PARTIES' PROPERTY AND
DEBTS,

j : . - . .:... .

.;•., cabw .... ..vJ :,.J panics assets and hainiK.es cqu-.,^

-...^.vi on

its findings as to the aniou*; oi tin. liabilities and the value of the assets, Flint division was as
follows:
I otal
Designers Carpet Showroom
Value
$194,000
Less sa!^
1.-^ !' (213,000)
1 :..

Ms. Penrose

Mr. Penrose

-0-

-0Equal

. a k i Spoilt

1/2

1/2

Ke\ Bank Certificate of Deposit
Value
$ 69,000
Less lour.
(40.0001
Net

$ 29,000

>•'!•••

1 .. .-i .

50,000

.illiiMWllgS

Bronco

$
$ 25,000

8,000

29,000
25,000
8,000

Snowmobiles

)

Trailer for snowmobiles

2,000

I 1W
Escrowed funds
1

178.000
$292,000
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109.000

69.000
$146,000

Ms. Penrose argues that this division of the assets and liabilities is improper for
several reasons. First, she asserts that the court incorrectly valued the parties' business,
Designers Carpet Showroom.

The parties stipulated to the value determined by Steve

Nicolatus for the business. Accordingly, the court found that the business had a value of
$194,000. Ms. Penrose does not attack that finding. However, the trial court found that this
positive value was offset by the business' sales tax liability to the State of Utah in the amount
of $213,000. Thus, the court found the net value of the business was zero.
Ms. Penrose argues in her brief that the liability to the Utah State Tax Commission
was "contingent." She offers no citation to the record in support of that assertion, nor does
she marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's finding that the amount of the sales
tax liability was $213,000, less a possible reduction of approximately $30,000. (Findings no.
13(a), R. at 614.) This court has repeatedly held that an appellant who attacks a trial court's
findings of fact has the obligation to marshal the evidence that support those findings and
"then demonstrate that, despite such evidence, the findings are 'so lacking in support as to be
against the clear weight of the evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous.'" Baker, 866 P.2d
at 543 (citations omitted). In this case, Ms. Penrose has not made the slightest effort to
marshal the evidence, nor has she pointed out any contrary evidence. There is no reason for
this court to interfere with the trial court's finding of fact based, as it is, on uncontro verted
evidence. (Tr. pp. 141-42, R. at 884-85.)
In Baker, 866 P.2d 540, the Court of Appeals said:
In a divorce proceeding there is no fixed formula from which to
determine the division of property. Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah
App. 1992). Thus, "[w]e afford the trial court 'considerable latitude in
adjusting financial and property interests, and its actions are entitled to a
presumption of validity.'" Id. (quoting Naranjo v, Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144,
1146 (Utah App. 1988)). The trial court's findings of fact are presumed to be
correct, and because we lack the advantage of seeing and hearing witnesses
testify, we do not make our own findings of fact. (Citations omitted.)
Id. at 542.
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We will alter the trial court's property division "only if there is a
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in a substantial and
prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or
such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.
Id. at 543 (citations omitted). Ms. Penrose has not argued, nor can she properly do so, that
such a situation exists in this case.
Ms. Penrose further argues that the trial court improperly valued the Key Bank
Certificate of Deposit. Again, the uncontroverted evidence supports the trial court's finding
of fact. Again, Ms. Penrose has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the finding and
then explain why the trial court's finding is not supported by the evidence. Mr. Penrose
testified that he had obtained a certificate of deposit in the original amount of $65,000 and
had borrowed $40,000 from his grandmother to do so. (Tr. pp. 309-10, R. at 1053-54.) The
trial court properly ordered him to repay the debt of $40,000 to his grandmother and thus,
assigned a net value of $29,000 to the certificate of deposit. (Findings no. 13(c), R. at 615.)
Ms. Penrose also argues that the trial court should have reduced the value of the cash
awarded to her by the amount she claimed to owe to her father or have treated that "debt" as a
marital obligation. However, this argument ignores the fact that the entire debt to Ms.
Penrose's father was incurred after the parties' separation (Tr. p. 298, R. at 1042.) Further,
much of the debt, totaling $43,725.20, was for attorneys' fees and detective fees, the
remainder of the obligation was incurred for Ms. Penrose's personal expenses incurred after
the parties' separation. In fact, the arrangement between Ms. Penrose and her father was that
he purchased a house for her, that she did not pay rent on a regular basis, and that he paid
many of her other living expenses.
During the time that Ms. Penrose was incurring the alleged obligation to her father,
Mr. Penrose was paying her temporary alimony and child support pursuant to the court's
order and she was receiving monthly income from her family trust in the amount of
approximately $1,000 per month.

She has offered no rationale for her theory that Mr.

17

Penrose ought somehow to finance her living beyond her means by borrowing from her
father.
Also, the trial court ruled that Ms. Penrose had adequate funds to pay her own
attorneys' fees. Ms. Penrose's attorneys' fees should not be considered a marital obligation
in the property division any more than Mr. Penrose's fees were considered a marital
obligation.
Based on the trial court's findings of fact, the trial court made a 50/50 division of the
property of the parties. Ms. Penrose has offered no basis for her assertion that the findings of
fact are not supported by the evidence and this court should affirm the decision of the trial
court.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S CHILD SUPPORT AWARD DID NOT
CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

Ms. Penrose argues that the trial court erred in awarding child support of $669 per
month, because $669 would be the appropriate amount of child support to order pursuant to
the child support guidelines if the parties' combined gross income totaled $10,000.
According to Ms. Penrose, the trial court erred by failing to award a higher amount of child
support when the parties' combined adjusted gross income totaled $11,032.
Ms. Penrose's argument misconstrues UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.12. That section
provides as follows:
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the highest level
specified in the table, an appropriate and just child support amount shall be
ordered on a case-by-case basis, but the amount ordered may not be less than
the highest level specified in the table for the number of children due support.
This statute simply directs the trial court to order an appropriate and just amount of child
support, not less than the highest level specified in the table. In this case, the court did award
the highest amount specified in the table and therefore has followed the statute precisely.

IS

Ms. Penrose argues that the trial court was required to consider the factors set forth in
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7(3) and that its failure to do so constituted an abuse of
discretion. However, § 78-45-7(3) applies to situations where the court has found sufficient
evidence to rebut the guidelines. In this case, Ms. Penrose did not argue at trial, nor did the
trial court find, that sufficient evidence had been introduced to rebut the guidelines.
In Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006 (Utah App. 1996), the Utah Court of Appeals held
that, when the adjusted gross incomes exceeded the guideline amount, simple linear
extrapolation from the child support guidelines was not appropriate. If the court wishes to
award support beyond the guideline amount, the Ball court said, it must make appropriate
findings. In this case, since the trial court awarded the correct guideline amount as it is
permitted to do under the statute, additional findings are not necessary. In addition, Ms.
Penrose did not present any evidence of special needs of Miles, the parties' child, for child
support beyond the guideline amount.
The trial court awarded the correct amount of child support under the guidelines and
then awarded sufficient alimony to make up the deficiency between Ms. Penrose's and Miles'
reasonable needs and the amount of income Ms. Penrose is able to produce. The trial court's
child support award should be affirmed.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
REFUSING TO AWARD ATTORNEYS' FEES TO MS.
PENROSE.

In a divorce, "[t]he decision to make such an award and the amount thereof rest
primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court." Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah
App. 1993.) In this case, the trial court found that Ms. Penrose has "sufficient monetary
assets based on the property division to pay the debt for her attorneys' fees." (Findings no.
15, R. at 617.)
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The Court of Appeals has indicated that if the court is to award fees, it must consider
the financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the
reasonableness of the requested fees. In this case, the court first considered the financial need
of the receiving spouse, Ms. Penrose, and determined that she had not shown a need for
assistance with her attorneys' fees. The court therefore did not consider the other two factors,
since Ms. Penrose had not met the first requirement.

It is difficult to understand Ms.

Penrose's argument that the court is still required to consider the reasonableness of the fees
requested, when in fact the court has determined that fees should not be awarded because of a
lack of need.
Again, Ms. Penrose has ignored the trial court's finding of fact that she was awarded
sufficient monetary assets to pay her attorneys' fees. She was awarded $109,000 in cash,
which clearly supports the notion that she can afford to pay her attorneys' fees, a substantial
portion of which had already been paid by her father. In light of the failure of Ms. Penrose to
marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's finding, it is difficult to meet her argument
that the court was somehow required to consider the other factors, even though the court
found that she had not satisfied the threshold requirement that she show a need for assistance
with her fees.
Ms. Penrose also ignores the fact that her father had already paid most of her fees and
that a portion of the debt she claimed to owe her father was for fees. In effect, Ms. Penrose
sought a double recovery—repayment of the debt to her father and an award of fees.
Further, even if the trial court were required to consider the reasonableness of the
fees, there is little question that the fees were unreasonable. Ms. Penrose changed attorneys
voluntarily twice.

She was first represented by Sharon Donovan of Dart, Adamson &

Donovan. She then retained Craig Peterson of Littlefield & Peterson. When Mr. Peterson
died, she was represented by Ann Wassermann for a period of time. Then, just a few weeks
before trial, she retained Clark Sessions, resulting in a continuance of the trial date. Her

20

claimed fees and costs totaled $89,000. By contrast, Mr. Penrose's legal fees for the same
period were approximately $20,000.
The trial court correctly found that Ms. Penrose had not shown a need for assistance
in payment of her attorneys' fees.
CONCLUSION
In making the arguments set forth in her brief, Ms. Penrose has simply attempted to
ignore the trial court's complete and adequate findings of fact on each of the issues raised in
her brief. The trial court made all the required findings with respect to the issue of alimony
and properly made an alimony award based on those findings.
Likewise, the trial court divided the property and obligations of the parties equally
based on its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The child support award also meets the requirements of Utah law and the child
support guidelines.
Finally, the court's refusal to award attorneys' fees was also based on appropriate
findings of fact and conclusions of law which are supported by the record.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court should be affirmed in all
respects.
DATED this 29th day of July, 1996.
Respectfully submitted,
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C.
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2034

ELLEN IV^AVCOCK
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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I hereby certify that I mailed three true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF
OF APPELLEE JEFFREY PENROSE to the following, postage prepaid, this 29th day of
July, 1996:
Clark W. Sessions, Esq.
Dean C. Andreasen, Esq.
Campbell, Maack & Sessions
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2215
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ADDENDUM INDEX

Exhibit

Description

A

UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1995 Supp.)

B

Plaintiffs Exhibit 14: Advances from Lloyd Hansen

C

Plaintiffs Exhibit 12: Plaintiffs Monthly Expenses

D

Defendant's Exhibit 7: Designers Carpet Showroom Earnings Available to
Owner—Sales Tax Liability Satisfied through Escrow and Other Funds and No
Buyout

E

Defendant's Exhibit 9: Designers Carpet Showroom Earnings Available to
Owner—No Buyout
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30-3-4. Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Use of affidavit
— Sealing.
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the plaintiff or
plaintiffs attorney.
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default or otherwise
except upon legal evidence taken in the cause. If the decree is to be entered
upon the default of the defendant, evidence to support the decree may be
submitted upon the affidavit of the plaintiff with the approval of the court.
(c) If the plaintiff and the defendant have a child or children and the
plaintiff has filed an action in the judicial district as defined in Section
78-1-2.1 where the pilot program shall be administered, a decree of divorce
may not be granted until both parties have attended a mandatory course
provided in Section 30-3-11.3 and have presented a certificate of course
completion to the court. The court may waive this requirement, on its own
motion or on the motion of one of the parties, if it determines course
attendance and completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in
the best interest of the parties.
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held before the court or
the court commissioner as provided by Section 78-3-31 and rules of the
Judicial Council. The court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall
enter the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree after default
of the defendant, upon the plaintiff's affidavit.
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by order of the court
upon the motion of either party. The sealed portion of the file is available to the
public only upon an order of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of
record or attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office of
Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied for or is receiving
public assistance, or the court have full access to the entire record. This sealing
does not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1211; L.
1909, ch. 60, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 2999; R.S. 1933
& C. 1943, 40-3-4; L. 1957, ch. 55, § 1; 1961,
ch. 69, § 1; 1969, ch. 72, § 2; 1983, ch. 116,
§ 1; 1985, ch. 151, § 1; 1989, ch. 104, § 1;
1990, ch. 230, § 1; 1991, ch. 5, § 35; 1992, ch.
98, § 1; 1992, ch. 290, § 3; 1995, ch. 62, § 1.

Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective July 1, 1995, added the second
sentence of Subsection (l)(b) and in the second
sentence of Subsection (l)(d) substituted "shall
enter the decree" for "shall make and file findings and decree" and added the language beginning "or, in the case of" at the end.

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and
health care of parties and children — Division of
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction —
Custody and visitation — Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital,
and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
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(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
* (i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or
incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders;
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A,
Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after
January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, an order
assessing against the obligor an additional $7 per month check processing
fee to be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of
Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services for the
purposes of income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11,
Parts 4 and 5.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide
child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance,
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for
debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best
interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation
schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter.
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or
defended against in good faith.
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the
other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation.
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining
alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and
(iv) the length of the marriage.

30-3-5
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(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining
alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living,
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance
with Subsection (a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the
time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves,
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the
court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at
the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial
material change in circumstances not forseeable at the time of the
divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time
the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this
subsection.
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial
ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse
if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that
consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the
payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the
party paying alimony is made a paTty to the action of annvklment and his rights
are determined.
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is cohabitating with another person.
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PENROSE v, PENROSE
Civil No. 93490224 DA
Plaintiff's Monthly Expenses

Rent

$ 1,150.00

Real property taxes (residence)
Real property insurance (residence)

154.56
49.49

Maintenance (residence)

269.88

Food and household supplies

400.00

Utilities including water, electricity, gas and heat

155.78

Telephone

198.00

Laundry and cleaning

115.00'

Clothing

425.00

Medial and Dental Insurance premium

250.00

Medical

90.83

Dental

100.00

Child care

200.00

Entertainment/Travel including Jazz tickets

500.00

Grooming

248.00

Gifts

100.00

Auto expense (gas, oil, repair, insurance)

329.50

Auto payments (leased)

338.00

Installment payments (Smith $100; Visa $100;
Chase $100; MC $100; Nordstrom $25; Dillard's $25)

450.00

Income Taxes (estimated)

450.00

TOTAL EXPENSES

$ 5,974.041

Includes expenses for Miles Penrose.

TabD

Karen Penrose v. Jeffrey Penrose
Civil No. 93 490 2224

Designers Carpet Showroom
Earnings Available To Owner
Sales Tax Liability Satisfied Through Escrow and Other Funds and No Buyout

Expected net earnings of DCS per valuation report
Workers Compensation expense adjustment 1

Adjusted Average

Avenge

1994 Actual

$ 80,000

$ 90,000

$107,000

(9.345)

(9.345)

(9.345)

Net earnings available for owner (cash basis)

$ 70,655

$ 80,655

$ 97,655

Taxable earnings available to owner

$ 70,655

$ 80,655

$ 97,655

Exemption and standard deduction
Taxable income
Tax liability (estimate)
Total cash available to owner (net earnings less tax liability)

(6.250)
$64,405
(18,454)
$ 52.201

(6.250)
$74,405
(22,054)
$ 58.601

(6.250)
$91,405
(28,174)
$ 69.481

Represents future costs of complying with 5/1/95 statute re subcontractors and workers compensation
assumed recurring lost profits of 50% of expected subcontractor payments of $210,000 @ 8.9% (1994 Workers
Compensation premium).

TabE

Karen Penrose v. Jeffrey Penrose
Civil No. 93 490 2224

Designers Carpet Showroom
Earnings Available To Owner—No Buyout

Adjusted Average

Avenge

1994 Actual

$ 80,000

$ 90,000

$107,000

(43,235)

(43,235)

(43,235)

Workers Compensation expense adjustment
Net earnings available to owner (cash basis)

^9.345)
$ 27,420

f9.345^
$ 37,420

$ 54,420

Taxable earnings available to owner
Exemption and standard deduction
Taxable income

$ 27,420

$ 37,420
ft>.250^
$ 31,170

$ 54,420
(6.250)
$ 48,170

Expected net earnings of DCS per valuation report
Sales tax liability-(assume $203,731 @ 11% for 7 years 1)

Tax liability (estimate)
Total cash available to owner:
(Taxable earnings less tax liability)

Sales tax liability per assessment
Interest from June 1994 through June 1995 ($30.16/day)
First quarter 1995 unfunded sales tax liability
Designer's portion (potential adjustment to assessment

(6.250)
$ 21,170
(4.234^

$ 23.186

(7.251)
$ 30.169

(12.86H

$ 41.559

$213,427
11,008
19,101
-39.805
$203.731

Represents future costs of complying with 5/1/95 statute re subcontractors and workers compensation
assumed recurring lost profits of 50% of expected subcontractor payments of $210,000 @ 8.9% (1994 Workers
Compensation premium).

